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Health Insurance 
Tax Credits and Health 
Insurance Coverage 
of Low-Income 
Single Mothers
The Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA) 
introduced a refundable tax credit for 
low-income families who purchased 
health insurance coverage for their 
children. This health insurance tax credit 
(HITC) existed during tax years 1991, 
1992, and 1993, and was then rescinded. 
Curiously, although many economists 
have espoused a refundable tax credit 
directed toward low-income families 
(Burman et al. 2007; Cogan, Hubbard, 
and Kessler 2005; Furman 2008; and 
Pauly 1999, among others), no one has 
estimated the effects of the HITC on 
health insurance coverage.
This article summarizes the evidence 
we report in a recent study (Cebi and 
Woodbury 2009) in which we use Current 
Population Survey data and a difference-
in-differences approach to estimate the 
effect of the 1991–1993 HITC on health 
insurance coverage of low-income single 
mothers. Access to health care for low-
income women and their children is a 
concern that extends well beyond health 
policy. Indeed, for many TANF and 
Medicaid recipients, lack of affordable 
health insurance has been a key barrier 
to escaping welfare. The fi ndings of our 
study suggest that during 1991–1993, 
the health insurance coverage of single 
mothers was about 6 percentage points 
higher than it would have been in the 
absence of the HITC. These fi ndings 
hardly suggest that an HITC would be a 
panacea for low-income families’ access 
to health care, but they do suggest that an 
HITC could be an effective component of 
a broader set of policies to expand access 
to health care. 
The Health Insurance Tax Credit, 
1991–1993 
When Congress passed OBRA, it 
added a supplemental credit for health 
insurance purchases to the basic Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC) program. 
This HITC was a refundable tax credit 
for low-income workers with one 
or more children who bought health 
insurance—either employer-provided or 
private nongroup—covering the children. 
The credit offset only the cost of health 
insurance—not copayments, deductibles, 
or out-of-pocket health expenses. The 
credit was refundable, so taxpayers with 
no federal income tax liability could 
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still receive a payment from the Internal 
Revenue Service. The HITC was repealed 
effective December 31, 1993, so it was 
available only during tax years 1991, 
1992, and 1993. 
The HITC and the EITC had the same 
eligibility criteria, and their schedules 
were similar. For example, in 1991, a 
taxpayer with earnings and a qualifying 
child could receive a credit up to $428 if 
he or she bought private health insurance 
that covered the child. For households 
with earned incomes of $1 to $7,140, the 
credit was 6 percent of earned income. 
For households with earnings between 
$7,140 and $11,250, the credit was $428 
(6 percent of $7,140), and for households 
with earnings between $11,250 and 
$21,250, the credit phased out at a rate 
of 4.28 percent per added dollar earned. 
In 1991, the average credit was $233, or 
23 percent of the reported average annual 
health insurance premium of $1,029. Also 
in 1991, 2.3 million taxpayers received 
health insurance credits of $496 million 
(U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce 
1994).
Main Findings
To estimate whether the HITC affected 
the private health insurance coverage of 
low-income single mothers, we develop 
a difference-in-differences analysis using 
1988–1993 Current Population Survey 
data on women aged 19–44 who worked 
(had annual hours greater than zero), 
were single (never married, widowed, or 
divorced), and had less than a high school 
education. We focus on high school 
dropouts because these women are likely 
to have low earnings and be eligible for 
the HITC. (We cannot explicitly examine 
low earners because the EITC creates 
incentives for earners to change their 
hours of work so as to qualify for the 
credit, and the sample would be self-
selected.)
We divide the sample of low-education 
working single women into two groups—
those with children and those without. 
The population potentially affected by the 
HITC—the “treatment” group—was low-
income working families with children. If 
the HITC had any effect on private health 
insurance coverage, then the coverage 
of low-income working families with 
children would have been greater than 
otherwise between 1991 and 1993. As a 
“control” group we use working single 
women without children and with less 
than a high school education. Because 
they do not have children, these women 
are ineligible for the HITC, but they 
should face essentially similar labor 
markets, tax policy (apart from the 
HITC), and other economic conditions 
as low-education working single mothers 
(the treatment group).
Figure 1 compares the average private 
health insurance coverage rates of 
working single mothers and of working 
single women without children during 
1988 through 1993. The coverage rate 
for single women without children fell 
between 1988 and 1993 (from 39.8 to 
20.9 percent), with most of the drop 
occurring after 1990 (from 37.8 to 20.9 
percent). A likely explanation for the drop 
after 1990 is the recession of 1991, which 
would have reduced both employment 
and access to employer-provided health 
insurance of single women. The private 
health insurance coverage rate of single 
mothers also fell from 1988 to 1993, but 
by much less—from 22.1 to 20.2 percent. 
Did the HITC cushion the fall of health 
insurance coverage of working single 
mothers?
Table 1 shows a simple difference-
in-differences analysis of the HITC. 
It displays the average private health 
insurance coverage rates for single 
mothers and single women without 
children in the years before and during 
the HITC. The fi rst row shows that 
health insurance coverage for single 
mothers (the treatment group) fell by 2.4 
percentage points between 1988–1990 
and 1991–1993. The second row shows 
that, over the same time period, coverage 
fell for single women without children 
Figure 1  Health Insurance Coverage Rates for Low-Education Working Single 
Mothers and Low-Education Working Single Women without Children
NOTE: Data are from the March 1989–1994 Annual Demographic Supplements to the Current 
Population Survey (CPS). The samples include working single women with less than a high 
school education, with “working” as positive hours and positive earnings during the year. We 
exclude women who are in school full time, those who are separated from their spouses, and 
those who report being ill or disabled. Means are tabulated using CPS March supplement weights. 
Sample sizes are 2,228 (single mothers) and 1,433 (single women without children).
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The estimates suggest that 
the Health Insurance Tax 
Credit increased health 
insurance coverage of working 
single mothers by about 6 
percentage points.
3Employment Research APRIL 2009
(the control group) by 9 percentage 
points. The implication is that, after 
netting out the declining trend in 
insurance coverage, the private health 
insurance coverage of single mothers was 
higher by 6.5 percentage points than it 
would have been without the HITC.
Without further tests, it would be 
unwise to conclude from the simple 
analysis in Table 1 that the HITC had a 
positive effect on the health insurance 
coverage of single women with children. 
Accordingly, we have developed 
difference-in-differences estimates 
controlling for individual characteristics 
that are correlated with health insurance 
coverage. The fi ndings are similar to 
those in Table 1. We have also performed 
a number of falsifi cation tests to check 
whether the fi ndings hold up under closer 
examination. For example, because 
women with more education tend to 
have higher earnings and are less likely 
to be eligible for the HITC, we would 
expect to estimate a relatively small 
(or no) effect of the HITC on working 
single mothers with high school and 
college. We would also expect the effect 
of the HITC to be nil for single mothers 
who do not work, again because they 
were ineligible for the HITC. The data 
support these expectations. Finally, we 
have performed sensitivity tests to check 
whether changes in Medicaid, state-level 
economic condition, or state welfare 
programs may be responsible for the 
changes we attribute to the HITC. The 
main fi nding appears to hold up to these 
sensitivity tests—the estimates suggest 
that the HITC increased health insurance 
coverage of working single mothers by 
about 6 percentage points.
Conclusion
With a new administration in 
Washington, and both houses of Congress 
now led by Democrats, sweeping 
reform of the U.S. health care system 
is receiving far more attention than in 
recent years. But as Zelinsky (2009) 
notes, incremental change, or Charles 
Lindblom’s “muddling through,” is 
the style of change in democracy, so 
employer-provided health benefi ts are 
likely to remain a central feature of U.S. 
health care fi nancing for the foreseeable 
future. It may be too early to dismiss 
incremental policy changes that have 
the potential to reduce health care costs 
or increase access to health care. A 
refundable tax credit for health insurance 
directed toward low-income families—
like the HITC of the early 1990s—has 
been espoused by many economists. The 
estimates we describe here suggest that 
the HITC increased health insurance 
coverage of low-education working 
single mothers by about 6 percentage 
points. Perhaps the HITC should remain 
in the health policy discussion after all.
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Before HITC
(1988–1990)
During HITC
(1991–1993) Difference
Single mothers 0.244 0.220 –0.024
(0.013) (0.013) (0.018)
[1,153] [1,075]
Single women without children 0.389 0.299 –0.090
(0.018) (0.017) (0.025)
[741] [692]
Difference –0.145 –0.080 —
(0.022) (0.022)
Difference-in-differences — — 0.065
(0.031)
Table 1  Private Health Insurance Coverage Rates for Low-Education 
 Working Single Mothers and Low-Education Working Single Women 
without Children
NOTE: See Figure 1. Figures are average private health insurance coverage rates. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. Sample sizes are in brackets.
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Kristin S. Seefeldt
Women, Work, 
and Welfare Reform 
This article summarizes fi ndings from the book, 
Working After Welfare: How Women Balance 
Jobs and Family in the Wake of Welfare 
Reform, published in 2008 by the Upjohn 
Institute (ordering information on p. 7–8).
Mishon is a hotel housekeeper in 
her early thirties with two teenagers. In 
2004, she earned just over the minimum 
wage. Instead of looking for a higher-
paying job, she preferred to stay with her 
current employer because her schedule 
was stable, which allowed time in the 
evenings to help her children with their 
homework. Amanda, an offi ce manager 
earning about $10 an hour, said that 
she too needed to spend time with her 
children rather than return to school to 
get a better job. “A lot of my time that I 
could devote to education and to work, 
I choose to spend on my children, and 
that’s temporary,” she said. “Once the 
kids are grown, I won’t have any real 
reasons to keep me from growing and 
moving ahead.” 
Mishon and Amanda were part of the 
Women’s Employment Study (WES), 
which was originally designed to follow 
about 750 Michigan welfare recipients 
as they attempted to make the transition 
from welfare to work. Over the course of 
the study, the majority of women left the 
welfare rolls for employment. However, 
many policymakers and advocates have 
noted that simply moving women from 
welfare and into jobs does not make their 
families self-suffi cient. Indeed, studies in 
several states following families leaving 
welfare found that for women who 
worked, wages were in the $7–$8 an hour 
range (Acs and Loprest 2003). 
When the WES surveys concluded, 
researchers conducted in-depth 
interviews in 2004 with some members of 
the study, including Mishon and Amanda, 
who had found jobs and had more or 
less remained steadily employed. While 
these women are typically considered 
the “successes” of welfare reform, many 
faced challenges in moving further up 
the economic ladder. Some found it 
diffi cult to obtain jobs that paid higher 
wages or to fi nd opportunities to increase 
their skills and thus their employment 
options. But the most common theme 
that emerged in women’s stories was the 
challenge of balancing work and family 
demands and the sacrifi ces women made 
to their own career advancement so that 
their children’s lives would be disrupted 
as little as possible. 
Working After Welfare: How Women 
Balance Jobs and Family in the Wake of 
Welfare Reform, which was published 
last year by the Upjohn Institute, 
explores issues related to employment 
advancement using both the survey 
and interview data from the Women’s 
Employment Study. This article provides 
highlights from the book.
The Women’s Employment Study 
The WES is a panel survey that began 
in 1997 and followed a random sample 
of welfare recipients from one urban 
Michigan county, collecting fi ve waves 
of survey data between 1997 and 2003. 
All women were between the ages of 18 
and 54 when the study began, received 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
in February 1997, and were African 
American or white U.S. citizens.  
Most of the sample left welfare by 
2003 and did not return. Many of these 
women worked in at least some months 
during a year. Employment rates among 
the sample climbed steadily throughout 
1997 and 1998 and reached a peak in 
November 1999, when nearly 80 percent 
of the women were employed. In August 
2003, the last month for which we have 
employment data for all respondents, 
just over two-thirds, 68.6 percent, were 
employed.
Descriptive Findings on 
Employment Transitions
Chapter 3 of the book presents 
fi ndings from a series of analyses looking 
at the employment trajectories of the 421 
women in the WES who were working 
at the beginning of the study (1997 or 
1998). I computed a wage that, assuming 
full-time, full-year work, would still 
leave a family of three (a single mother 
and two children, the typical family in 
the WES) below the federal poverty 
line. In 1997 this rate was $6.15 an hour 
(or $6.25 in 1998). I consider women 
working in jobs paying those wages (or 
less) to have below-poverty-wage jobs in 
the initial period. In 2003, the comparable 
wage rate for a below-poverty-wage job 
is $7.05 an hour. I categorize women as 
having above-poverty-wage jobs if their 
hourly rates put them above the federal 
poverty line. In 1997–1998, this would 
translate into wage rates above $6.16–
$6.26.
Among respondents working in 1997 
or 1998, 55.1 percent were in poverty-
wage jobs and 44.9 percent were in 
above-poverty-wage jobs. By 2003, a 
much smaller proportion, 26.6 percent, 
were in poverty-wage jobs, with 50.8 
percent in above-poverty-wage jobs. The 
remaining 22.6 percent reported no work 
during 2003, and thus I categorize them 
as being unemployed. As shown in Table 
1, just over 17 percent of working sample 
members started and ended the study 
employed in poverty-wage jobs, or jobs 
that paid less than $7.05 an hour (in 2003 
dollars). A smaller fraction, 9 percent, 
were working in above-poverty-wage 
jobs (that is, jobs paying more than $7.05 
an hour) when the study started, but by 
2003 they were no longer being paid 
this much and instead were in poverty-
wage jobs. About a quarter moved from 
poverty-wage jobs to above-poverty-
Employment rates among 
the sample climbed steadily 
throughout 1997 and 1998 and 
reached a peak in November 
1999, when nearly 80 percent 
of the women were employed.
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wage jobs, while just over 9 percent 
held an above-poverty-wage job in both 
periods. 
Selected Multivariate Findings
Regression analyses document that 
a number of human capital problems, 
such as not knowing proper workplace 
behaviors, low levels of previous work 
experience, and prior discrimination are 
associated with ending the study in a 
poverty-wage job or with unemployment. 
Persistent transportation and health 
problems were signifi cantly related to 
remaining in a poverty-wage job or 
to becoming unemployed. This set of 
fi ndings suggests that the strong economy 
of the late 1990s allowed some women to 
get low-paying jobs but not necessarily 
advance or enjoy stable employment. 
These analyses provide some insight 
into the types of barriers that keep people 
in lower-paying jobs or contribute to 
unemployment; however, they do not 
shed light upon the actual processes 
behind movements up or down the 
employment ladder. Several chapters 
in the book use information from 
qualitative interviews with a number 
of WES respondents to illustrate some 
of the employment patterns described 
above. Through in-depth discussions with 
these women, I learned more about the 
problems they encountered in fi nding and 
keeping jobs and the choices and trade-
offs they made in balancing work and 
family life. 
Qualitative Findings
Tensions between motherhood and 
career advancement opportunities, 
whether it be decisions to return to 
school or choices women make about 
upward movement on the job, emerged 
as perhaps the most striking common 
feature across interviews. This was true 
regardless of the wage level of the jobs in 
which women worked. Women expressed 
a strong desire to spend time with their 
children and participate in their activities. 
This desire sometimes got in the way of 
further advancement. 
Jackie, who worked in a grocery store, 
did not apply for a promotion because 
it meant transferring to a store farther 
away. She explained how her daughter’s 
schedule played a role in her employment 
decisions: “If it [the job] was in my store, 
I probably would [apply], but if it was 
somewhere else, I just can’t do it right 
now because of my nine-year-old . . . 
I’d have to get up earlier and I ain’t got 
nobody here to get my daughter.”
Concerns about their children’s 
well-being were also a main reason 
that women put off participating in 
education and training. Amanda, the 
offi ce manager of a law fi rm, represents 
this struggle. She said, “My choices are 
to take night classes and not be around 
the kids, which I don’t like. They’re 
teenagers—they need me at home now 
more than they ever did . . . I have 
daughters. My youngest has a boyfriend 
now, so I don’t want to be one of those 
moms and then complain later on, ‘Well, 
what happened?’ If I take classes during 
the day, I’m missing work, which is my 
paycheck, so I can’t do that because my 
paychecks are lower. I can’t do that.” 
In fact, one-third of the women 
we interviewed, when asked about 
their greatest challenges to further 
advancement, said that responsibilities 
to their children prevented them from 
moving up. A number of women believed 
that once their children were grown, they 
could devote time to themselves and 
would be able to advance. Sierra held this 
view, noting that her purpose for working 
now was not to get ahead but to provide 
for her children: “It’s my family and kids 
right now. It [work] ain’t just for me, 
basically right now it’s for the kids. I’ll 
have my life later.” Of course, putting 
children before job advancement did 
mean that, generally, the family’s income 
remained low.
Conclusion
Many former welfare recipients are 
actively engaged in the labor market; 
some have moved up the employment 
ladder, but many others still earn 
relatively low wages. Yet most women 
we interviewed believed that their 
chances to improve were limited because 
of their responsibilities as parents. When 
faced with a choice between higher 
wages or control over their schedules, 
many chose the latter. Policy could do 
more not only to respect that decision 
but to help families by better supporting 
working parents. 
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Transition type %
Poverty wage both periods 17.3
Poverty wage to above-poverty wage 24.7
Poverty wage to unemployment 13.1
Above-poverty wage both periods 26.1
Above-poverty wage to poverty wage 9.3
Above-poverty wage to unemployment 9.5
Table 1  Employment Transitions, 1997–1998 to 2003, Workers with Valid Starting 
Wages (n = 421)
NOTE: A poverty-wage job is equivalent to $6.15 an hour or less in 1997 and $7.05 and hour in 
2003.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations from WES data.
The strong economy of the 
late 1990s allowed some 
women to get low-paying jobs 
but not necessarily advance or 
enjoy stable employment.
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Was mass privatization responsible for 
the increased mortality in postcommunist 
societies during the 1990s? This 
claim appears in a recent article in the 
British medical journal Lancet, and has 
been subsequently reported in many 
newspapers (see Stuckler, King, and 
McKee 2000). The article documents 
a robust correlation between the extent 
of privatization and the adult male 
mortality rate using country-level data for 
about 24 economies of Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union. A storm 
of controversy among defenders and 
attackers of “shock therapy” policies has 
ensued. While much of the discussion 
is ideological, legitimate questions can 
be raised about various aspects of the 
methodology of the article, including the 
use of country-level data to study death 
and ownership—phenomena that are 
inherently micro. 
What requires more attention is 
the question of causality: how could 
changing ownership from state to private 
have raised mortality? The Lancet 
authors theorize that privatized fi rms 
cut employment, and then refer to the 
extensive evidence on the negative 
impact of unemployment on health to 
link job loss to mortality. But is the fi rst 
step valid; that is, does privatization 
systematically lead to substantial job 
loss? The Lancet article provides no 
evidence on this question.
In a forthcoming study in the 
Economic Journal (Brown, Earle, and 
Telegdy forthcoming) we fi nd that the 
answer is a clear “no.” Our analysis 
is not at the country level, as in the 
Lancet article. The problem with such 
aggregated data is that a variety of 
confounding infl uences may explain 
the results—just the sort of issues that 
have heated up the blogosphere, but that 
may never be resolved simply because 
they cannot be measured. Instead, our 
analysis uses data on nearly every 
manufacturing fi rm inherited from the 
socialist period in four major transition 
economies: Hungary, Romania, Russia, 
and Ukraine. The fi rm is the level at 
which decisions on employment are 
made, and with our data we directly 
observe ownership, employment, and 
many other variables. Equally important, 
we observe fi rms for many years (up to 
20 years in these databases), so we can 
follow the path of employment and other 
variables for long periods both before and 
after privatization takes place. We also 
observe fi rms that are never privatized, 
which together with those that are not 
yet privatized (but will be) can form a 
control group in examining the effect of 
privatization on employment within a 
particular industry and year. The ability 
to compare fi rms within industries and 
years—apples with apples, rather than 
apples with oranges—is another benefi t 
of analyzing data at the level of the 
decision maker, rather than the aggregate.
Analyzing these data with several 
statistical methods to control for possible 
biases due to selection of fi rms for 
privatization, we fi nd no evidence that 
privatization systematically lowers fi rm-
level employment. Figure 1 contains 
results with two alternative methods: 
fi rm fi xed effects and fi rm-specifi c 
trends (labeled “without trends” and 
“with trends” in the fi gure, respectively). 
The estimated effects of privatization 
to domestic owners are generally 
positive, and where they are negative the 
magnitudes are very small and usually 
statistically indistinguishable from 
Mass Privatization 
and Mortality: Is Job 
Loss the Link?
W.E. Upjohn Institute Issue Brief 
John S. Earle
zero. The estimated effects of foreign 
privatization are almost always positive, 
large, and statistically signifi cant, 
generally implying a 10–30 percent 
expansion of employment following the 
foreign acquisition. In the country with 
the most (in)famous mass privatization, 
Russia, the domestic privatization effects 
are positive, and when estimated with 
trends the effect is the largest of any 
of these four countries. Analysis of the 
long time series shows that the absence 
of negative employment effects of 
privatization is the consequence neither 
of delayed restructuring several years 
after privatization nor of preprivatization 
downsizing, which is negligible in these 
economies.
These empirical results strongly 
contradict the notion, frequently assumed 
but little investigated, that large job 
cuts follow privatization. Why is this 
assumption empirically incorrect? One 
possibility is that privatization matters 
little for fi rm behavior: new private 
owners do not restructure and do not lay 
off workers. Our research investigates 
this possibility by decomposing the 
employment effects of privatization 
into two components, “productivity” 
and “scale” effects. Holding the fi rm’s 
scale—its level of production—constant, 
an increase in productivity tends to lower 
employment. Holding constant the level 
of productivity, an increase in scale tends 
to raise it.
Our empirical analysis of these 
mechanisms fi nds that privatization tends 
to raise both productivity and scale. 
Both effects are much larger in fi rms 
Figure 1  Estimated Privatization Effect on Employment  
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SOURCE: Brown, Earle, and Telegdy (forthcoming).
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New and Recent Books
The Power 
of a Promise
Education and Economic 
Renewal in Kalamazoo
Michelle Miller-Adams
When a group of anonymous donors 
announced in 2005 that they would send 
every graduate of the 
Kalamazoo Public 
Schools to college 
for free, few within 
or outside this mid-
sized Michigan 
community understood 
the magnitude of 
the gesture. In the 
fi rst comprehensive 
account of the 
Kalamazoo Promise, Michelle Miller-
Adams addresses both the potential and 
challenges inherent in place-based universal 
scholarship programs and explains why this 
unprecedented experiment in education-based 
economic renewal is being emulated by 
scores of cities and towns across the nation.
 “Michelle Miller-Adams captures the 
truly unique story of the Kalamazoo Promise 
without losing sight of the universal lessons it 
offers us. [This book] is essential reading for 
anyone who wants to understand the future 
of economic and community development 
in our country.” –Governor Jennifer M. 
Granholm, State of Michigan
274 pp. 2009 $40 cloth 978-0-88099-340-1  
$18 paper 978-0-88099-339-5
Working 
After Welfare
How Women Balance 
Jobs and Family in the 
Wake of Welfare Reform
Kristin Seefeldt
In Working after Welfare: How Women 
Balance Jobs and Family in the Wake of 
Welfare Reform, we 
experience the day-
to-day struggles these 
women face and the 
reasons why they 
tend to remain in 
low-wage, dead-end 
jobs.  The hundreds 
of women who were 
followed in the WES 
were not constrained 
by the decision whether to work or to stay 
home and raise their kids, but by one of 
fi nding the right balance between caregiving 
responsibilities and their families’ fi nancial 
and other needs. Interestingly, though, once 
that balance was attained, many women 
chose to remain in a job or forego additional 
schooling even if it meant stagnant or 
slow wage growth for fear of interrupting 
their children’s schedules or because of an 
unwillingness to spend less time with their 
families.
171 pp. 2008 $40 cloth 978-0-88099-345-6 
$18 paper 978-0-88099-344-9.
Against the Tide
Household Structure, 
Opportunities, and Outcomes 
among White and Minority Youth
Carolyn J. Hill, Harry J. Holzer,  
and Henry Chen
The authors examine the effects of 
household structure on young adults and 
how these effects might have contributed 
to the negative trends in employment and 
educational outcomes 
observed for young 
minorities over time. 
In addition to studying 
these links, they 
also provide a better 
understanding of the 
means through which 
growing up in a single-
parent household might 
affect youth outcomes, 
and they reveal other factors that might either 
reinforce or counteract these household 
effects. 
 The bottom line, say the authors, is that 
young people growing up in single-parent 
households face a combination of additional 
challenges compared to young people growing 
up in two-parent families, and that these 
challenges, while not insurmountable, pose 
a signifi cant hurdle to achieving educational 
and employment success. 
172 pp. 2009 $40 cloth 978-0-88099-342-5
$16 paper 978-0-88099-341-8
privatized to foreign investors, with 
10–25 percent increases in productivity, 
and 15–40 percent increases in scale. 
The dominance of the scale over the 
productivity effect implies the positive 
impact of privatization that we observe 
on employment. 
In none of these countries do 
we observe substantial job cuts due 
to privatization. The causal link 
hypothesized in the Lancet article is 
not supported by the fi rm-level data. 
Nor is it supported by other studies we 
have carried out of layoffs and worker 
turnover in privatized fi rms. Of course, 
it is possible that some other link, not 
suggested by the article and unrelated 
to employment outcomes, could explain 
the observed privatization-mortality 
correlation at the country level. Our 
analysis suggests that further progress 
on this question would benefi t from 
analysis of data at the level where the 
action occurs: individual data in the case 
of death, and fi rm data in the case of 
privatization.
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